编者按：清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波应日本户田和平研究所（Toda Peace Institute）邀请，撰写了《信任的基础是对话——中美战略竞争的相处之道》一文，近期由该研究所正式发布。

在当前中美关系陷入战略竞争、互信持续流失的背景下，周波主张构建“可控竞合”的底线逻辑，强调双方应通过常态化对话与多层次危机管控机制，防止竞争滑向对抗。他提出16项具体政策建议，包括重启危机热线、推动中美军舰军机间直接沟通、就“不首先使用核武器”开展对话等，指出“对话不以信任为前提，却可为信任创造条件”。

文章还就台湾问题、人工智能、网络安全与外空合作等关键议题展开剖析，认为面对特朗普2.0时期更为交易化、对抗色彩更浓的美方政策走向，中国应保持战略定力，推动以风险可控与责任共担为导向的中美互动模式，助力全球战略稳定。

北京对话和观察者网翻译发布如下。

【文/周波， 翻译/王凡非】

中国和美国是世界上最大的两个经济体和军事强国，21世纪的世界面貌在很大程度上取决于中美如何共处。从理论上讲，中美共处应比冷战时期美国与苏联这两个宿敌之间的共处更容易。然而，事实可能并非如此。

冷战期间，中美各自主导的势力范围划分清晰，这使得双方能够避免直接冲突。但在中国的专属经济区内，中美之间甚至不存在舰船和飞机的缓冲区，双方时常发生遭遇情况。

此外，冷战时期美国和苏联通过相互核威胁达成了 “相互确保摧毁” 的战略均势，而中美之间并不存在这种均势，尽管在西太平洋地区，过去几十年中国军队取得了显著进步，使得中美军事力量差距逐渐缩小，且态势逐渐向有利于中国的方向发展。

努力使中美竞合的关系可控

特朗普总统连任后推行的“让美国再次伟大”（MAGA）的零和政策已使世界陷入更多动荡和不确定性。他对全球发起的关税战只是一个例子。这位更注重交易而非意识形态的总统似乎没有明确的对华政策。

一个问题是，他将如何应对身边的对华鹰派人士？在2025年5月的香格里拉对话上，听到美国国防部长海格塞思发表了全面攻击“共产主义中国”的演讲，笔者不禁联想，特朗普是否想扮演“好警察”，而让身边的对华鹰派扮演“坏警察”？

今年5月31日，美国防长海 格塞思在香格里拉对话会上发表演讲，大肆渲染中国威胁 外媒

在对话中，海格塞思不遗余力地描述中国的威胁真实可信，且“迫在眉睫”。这与他的前任奥斯汀在2023年和2024年对话中表示冲突并非“迫在眉睫”或“不可避免”的立场形成了180度的反转。海格塞思更进一步猜测，中国军队被要求在2027年前具备武统台湾的能力。

若要用一个词来概括笔者对中美关系的最大期许，那便是“可控”（manageable）。展望未来几年，笔者会用“竞合”来形容中美关系——也就是合作与竞争并存的状态。

当然，关键在于二者的比例如何权衡。美国担忧其霸权地位可能被中国永久取代，在这种情况下，中国如一味强调中美必须是合作关系，恐怕只是徒劳。但双方理应达成底线共识：不能让竞争演变为对抗。

这种共识的达成并非没有可能，一方面，大国关系即便存在竞争性，也依然具备韧性；另一方面，在当今世界，美国既无法拼凑出反华联盟，中国也无力带领“全球南方”国家反美。中国是美国的多数盟友的最大贸易伙伴。和其他国家一样，它们会根据具体问题审慎做出抉择，而非盲目追随美国。随着西方自由民主持续式微，即便是美国的盟友，在这个后西方世界里，也不会认同“民主对抗专制”那套说辞。笔者毫不怀疑，当特朗普结束第二任期时，美国的全球形象和信誉将进一步受损。

中美应追求相互确保的共存

如果说冷战的特点是两个宿敌之间的“相互确保摧毁”，那么今天，这两个竞争者或许可以追求“相互确保共存”。在笔者看来，中国和美国之间的相互确保共存可以通过增加开放的沟通渠道、加强信任建设、在可能领域开展合作以及共同承担大国国际责任来实现。

信任，但要对话

1987年12月，美国总统里根与苏联领导人戈尔巴乔夫签署《中程核力量条约》后，里根曾说过一句名言：“信任但核查。”这不过是礼貌地表达“因为我不信任你，所以我们必须核查”。

同样的逻辑今天依然适用：信任并非中国和美国之间对话或互动的必要前提。美国和苏联之间毫无信任，但它们仍设法建立了一系列信任建设措施，并在消灭天花与和平探索外太空方面进行了合作。

如果说“信任但核查”是冷战时代的特征，那么对今天的中美关系而言，“信任但对话”或许是更合适的范式。

冷战期间，美国和苏联最大的恐惧是核战争。因此，限制、削减和核查对方的核武库成为必须。而中美之间的情况并非如此。尽管五角大楼认为中国正在迅速发展其核武库，但据报道，中国目前的核弹头储备估计约为600枚，仅为美国的大约十分之一。因此，两个竞争者的首要任务是培养定期对话的习惯，以避免误解和误判。看到这两个大国对话而非对抗，对世界其他地区的人民来说也是一大宽慰。

迄今为止，因新冠疫情和2022年佩洛西窜访台湾而中断的中美之间的对话已恢复。这些对话包括高级别军事沟通、中美防务政策协调对话以及中美海上军事安全磋商机制会议。令人欣喜的是还有新的进展：2024年，中国军队南方战区司令员吴亚男上将与美国印太司令部司令帕帕罗上将举行了视频会议。

这些机制的重要性不言而喻，但它们不应仅仅是例行公事。相反，高级军官的互访应实现常态化；2008年建立的热线应更频繁使用；还应鼓励飞行员和水兵之间的直接沟通，因为随着中国军队全球行动的增加，近距离遭遇不仅会在中国附近海域和空域发生，也会在其他地区不可避免地发生。

中美应防止海空事故

美国飞机定期在中国专属经济区内进行近距离监视和侦察，其海军舰艇也在中国在南海拥有主权的岛礁附近水域航行。根据五角大楼2023年关于中国军事与安全发展的报告，美国记录了2021年秋季至2023年秋季期间，中国军队对美国飞机在该地区进行超过180次所谓“胁迫性和高风险”的空中拦截。这意味着几乎每四天就会发生一次这样的危险情况。因此，至少在理论上，像2001年中国战斗机与美国侦察机致命碰撞那样的事件再次发生，似乎只是时间问题。

2022年12月，美方1架RC-135型机在中国华南沿海、海南西沙群岛当面抵近侦察时，蓄意改变飞行姿态、危险抵近我机 视频来源：南部战区

几十年来，中美海军之间的双边磋商一直围绕中文术语“安全”发生争议，这个词在英文中既可以指“security”（安全），也可以指“safety”（平安）。美国希望就“平安”问题进行更多技术性讨论，以避免舰船和飞机之间的近距离危险遭遇；而中国则强调其“安全”关切——美国海军在中国专属经济区的监视和侦察以及在南海的“航行自由行动”是对中国主权的挑衅，应停止或至少降低频率。美国要求监视美国军舰的中国军舰保持安全距离，而中国则回应说，如果你们根本不来，才是最安全的。在国际场合，中国代表经常指出，所有这些危险的近距离遭遇都发生在中国周边空域和领海，而不是美国周边空域和领海。

国际海洋法对此帮助不大。《联合国海洋法公约》的条款存在模糊性，允许各方选择性地解释以支持自己的立场。原因在于，该公约经过人类历史上最漫长的九年谈判才达成。为了加速谈判，谈判中在多处做出了必要妥协，以保持灵活性。

笔者自己的经历或许有助于理解这一棘手问题。2013年，笔者带领中国工作组前往五角大楼，讨论航行自由的法律含义——这是双方分歧的焦点。尽管双方都派出了最优秀的法律专家，但唯一达成的共识仅仅是《联合国海洋法公约》规定的“航行和飞越自由”，而这是不言而喻的。双方在“航行和飞越自由”的构成、“和平目的”的定义以及对沿海国权利和利益应给予多大程度的“适当顾及”等问题上存在巨大分歧。这让笔者想起了俾斯麦的一句话：“法律就像香肠，最好不要看到它们是如何制作的。”在这方面，《联合国海洋法公约》就像是有史以来最长的一根香肠！

但中美之间仍存在一个重要共识：双方都不希望发生意外，更不要说对抗了。因此，两国军队不仅需要让飞行员和水兵遵守双边及多边协议中关于规范空中飞行与舰船航行的要求，以此防范意外发生；还需要探讨意外发生后的应对措施。2020年，中国国防部与美国国防部通过视频会议，召开了首次危机沟通工作小组会议，就危机沟通、危机预防及危机管理的相关理念展开讨论。这是“危机管理”首次被正式提出，堪称一个大胆且正确的举措。可惜的是，受新冠疫情及此后局势持续紧张的影响，这一机制已然中断。

中美应避免台湾海峡冲突

无论南海发生何种事故，双方强烈的民族主义呼声都不可避免，都很难让人相信这会引发中美军队之间的全面冲突。2001年中国战斗机与美国侦察机的致命碰撞并未导致世界末日。美国机组人员在美方政府发表“两个遗憾”信函（而非正式道歉）后获释，拆解后的美国EP-3E飞机也被归还。这起致命事件在11天内得到解决。默契而高超的外交手段发挥了主导作用，为双方保住了面子。

唯一可能将中美拖入全面冲突的问题，是台湾问题。当前，一种危险的“行动-反应”模式正在形成：美国担忧中国大陆可能采取军事行动，因而加速对台军售，扩大对台军事培训与人员往来，企图将台湾打造成“豪猪”。对此，中方虽感愤怒，却也愈发坚定自信，采取了相应反制措施——不仅派遣更多战机常态化穿越此前作为双方缓冲区的台海中线，还针对最坏情况开展各类演练，且演练频率不断提升。

在2025年香格里拉对话会上，海格塞思不遗余力地渲染所谓中国威胁的“真实性”与“紧迫性”，甚至臆测中国军队被要求在2027年前具备“武统台湾”的能力。这种说法纯属危言耸听。根据中国2005年颁布的《反分裂国家法》，大陆可能采取非和平方式解决台湾问题的三大条件之一，是判断和平统一的前景已完全丧失。但即便在2025年1月台湾地区选举中民进党赖清德当选后，也没有迹象表明中国大陆已得出如此悲观的结论。

2024年4月，习近平主席在会见台湾地区前领导人马英九时指出，推动两岸关系和平发展势在必行，而关键就在于坚持一个中国原则。中国大陆从未宣布过统一的时间表。乌克兰危机爆发后，中国的国防预算占GDP比重仍低于2%。这与美国要求其欧洲及亚洲盟友将国防开支提升至GDP的5%形成了鲜明对比。这一差异充分展现了中国的冷静与自信，在一定程度上也折射出中国对中美关系的判断。

在2023年3月底台军“步兵117旅”在“教召训练”现场出现的外籍人员，当时就有猜测其疑似美军派驻台湾的教官

大陆方面也在积极争取台湾民心。据报道，新冠疫情爆发前，有150万台湾同胞在大陆工作生活。这意味着，台湾至少6%的中上层群体并不排斥在截然不同的政治体系下生活——只要大陆能提供比台湾更优越的发展机会。2023年9月，大陆发布一项规划，承诺为台湾同胞在福建省的工作生活提供更多便利，具体包括放宽购房政策、保障台湾地区学生在公立学校享有同等入学待遇，还计划通过燃气、电力管线及桥梁建设，将大陆港口城市厦门与仅数公里之隔的金门地区相连通。

美国应当意识到，对中国而言，台湾问题若处理失当，所有事情都可能陷入停滞。因此，为维护台海和平，美国需要让中国相信，其宣称的“一个中国”政策并未被架空。倘若避免与俄罗斯直接对抗是美国的底线，那么同理，作为守成大国，美国也应将避免与崛起的中国发生战争视为不可逾越的红线。

在一切可能的领域开展合作

使竞争“健康”的正确方式是尽可能开展合作。这里有三个领域尤其值得关注：人工智能、网络和外太空。作为地球上最强大的国家，中国和美国在为人类制定这些新领域的规则和法规方面负有不可推卸的责任。

2023年11月旧金山会晤期间，习主席与拜登总统同意建立人工智能政府间对话机制。其中最重要的原则，或许是就“人工智能在核指挥控制系统中的应用必须接受人类绝对监督”达成共识。要探讨这一问题，中美首先需要向对方说明各自核指挥控制系统的具体情况——但这在可预见的未来恐怕难以实现。

不过，若中国确实在扩充核武库，其与美国的核力量差距可能逐步缩小，届时中国在核谈判中或许会采取更积极的态度。与此同时，一个更具现实意义的做法是讨论中国几十年来一直倡导的“不首先使用核武器”政策。这一政策虽不易被接受（毕竟美国的盟友依赖美国的核保护伞），但承诺不首先使用核武器，并不会削弱一个核大国的报复能力。鉴于俄罗斯在乌克兰战争中隐晦威胁使用核武器，且战事短期内看不到结束的迹象，推动这一议题似乎是更切实的优先事项。

在网络领域，很难界定一起网络事件究竟是间谍活动还是网络战。但有一条底线必须坚守：绝不能攻击关键信息网络，比如军事指挥控制系统。2013年，美国与俄罗斯建立了国家计算机应急响应小组之间的联络机制，双方同意通过核风险降低中心就网络演习相互通报，并在白宫与克里姆林宫之间设立了直接热线。中美两国在政府及军事层面同样设有热线。说到底，两国或许可以考虑交换一份清单，明确列出在任何情况下都不应遭受攻击的敏感目标。

由于2011年美国国会通过的《沃尔夫修正案》对美国航空航天局与中国的太空合作施加了限制（尽管并非完全禁止），中美在太空领域的重大合作难以实现。其背后的原因是，美国担心中国可能“窃取”其技术。但颇具讽刺意味的是，到2030年，中国或许会拥有全球唯一的空间站，届时美国宇航员可能需要请求搭乘。2019年，中国成为首个实现探测器月球背面软着陆的国家，美国航空航天局彼时获得国会批准，与中国航天机构开展特定合作，即利用美国航空航天局的月球勘测轨道器对中国探测器的着陆过程进行监测。

承担大国责任

大国肩负重大责任。作为世界上最大的两个经济体，中国和美国还必须为其他国家的福祉进行合作。以中东为例。在中东问题上，中国和美国在两个重要问题上曾持相似立场——防止伊朗发展核弹以及解决以色列-哈马斯冲突的“两国方案”。

中美两国都不希望看到伊朗成为核国家，但美国对伊朗核设施突然发动的大规模轰炸令所有人震惊。中国对此自然表示谴责，尤其是因为这些设施处于国际原子能机构的监督之下。

6月22日，卫星拍下的高清图像显示，遭遇美国轰炸后，伊朗福尔道地下核设施出现6个新冲击坑。

在这一问题上，中国最大的优势在于赢得了伊方的信任。面对美国的制裁，中国是唯一向伊朗提供经济生命线的大国。不过，即便中国谴责了以色列和美国对伊朗主权与领土完整的公然侵犯，也应当向伊朗当局明确指出：如果伊朗决定封锁霍尔木兹海峡，不仅会严重威胁这条最重要的国际航道之一，还会使其高度依赖石油出口的经济陷入困境。

美国长期以来支持解决巴以冲突的“两国方案”，赋予巴勒斯坦人在以色列占领的约旦河西岸和加沙地带的主权。这是自1993年美国帮助促成《奥斯陆协议》以来的国策。特朗普对“两国方案”不感兴趣，但他不会永远待在白宫。随着加沙经历50多年来最严重的暴力冲突，1974年联合国决议首次提出的“两国方案”可能看似遥不可及，但即使是梦想，如果能给予人们希望也是有用的。我们怎能断言“两国方案”只是梦想？没有哪场战争会永远持续。随着加沙死亡人数的增加，越来越多的国家开始承认巴勒斯坦。据报道，截至2025年6月18日，加沙战争已造成超过57,800人死亡。战争结束后，“两国方案”几乎肯定会赢得更多同情，并显得更可接受。

在乌克兰战争中，曾夸口在24小时内解决这一问题的特朗普总统请求中国协助。随着时间推移，美国对持久的僵局似乎越来越感到沮丧。中国促成交战方谈判的意愿已体现在2023年2月的12点和平计划以及2024年5月与巴西共同提出的六点建议中。但中国不可能如一些西方人士所希望的那样单方面命令普京总统结束战争来解决问题。现在判断最终结果还为时过早。但如果最终达成停火或休战，中国或许可以与其他大国一起提供集体安全保障。或者，如果有一天需要维和行动，中国可以带头派遣维和人员，与全球南方的其他部队派遣国一起行动。这比任何派遣北约部队的提议都要好得多，后者肯定会被俄罗斯拒绝。

结论

大国关系从未如人们期望的那般理想，但可以朝着降低危险性的方向发展。无论中美谁保持领先，这两个最大经济体之间的差距都将十分微小。这意味着它们之间的竞争或许确实会加剧，但合作也不会让任何一方付出过高代价。中美两国尚未成为敌人，而且也没有任何科学定律证明，竞争者就必定会变成敌人。

TRUST BUT TALK: HOW TO MANAGE CHINA–US STRATEGIC COMPETITION

Zhou Bo

Introduction

What the 21st century will look like depends largely on how China and the US, the world’s two largest economies and the two strongest military powers, can coexist. In theory, this should be easier than between the US and the Soviet Union, the two archrivals of the Cold War. But it won’t necessarily be the case. During the Cold War, there were clearly defined spheres of influence dominated by Washington and Moscow that allowed them to avoid direct confrontation. In the case of China and the United States, there isn’t even a buffer zone between their ships and aircraft in China’s exclusive economic zones, where they regularly encounter each other. Besides, the United States and the Soviet Union were balanced by mutually assured destruction thanks to the equilibrium of a mutual nuclear threat. This is not found between Beijing and Washington, although in the Western Pacific, the gap in military strength is shrinking in China’s favour thanks to the advances of the PLA in the past decades.

Making China-US ‘copetition’ manageable

A reelected President Trump’s zero-sum MAGA (Make America Great Again) has already plunged the world into more turbulence and volatility. The tariff war he launched against the whole world is just one example. The transactional rather than ideological president doesn’t seem to have a clear China policy. One problem is how he will heed the China hawks around him. While listening to US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2025, which was an all-out attack on “communist China”, I wondered if Trump wishes to play good cop while allowing China hawks around him to play bad cops. At the Dialogue, Hegseth spared no effort to describe how the China threat is real and could be “imminent.” This is a 180-degree shift from that of his predecessor Lloyd Austin who said at the dialogue in 2023 and 2024 that a conflict was not imminent or inevitable. Hegseth went further to speculate that the PLA has been asked to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027.

If I could use just one word to describe my best hope for the China–US relationship, it is ‘manageable’. Looking down the road, the China–US relationship in years to come is one that I would describe as ‘copetition’, combining elements of both cooperation and competition. The question, of course, is the ratio between the two. At a time when Washington worries that it might lose its primacy to Beijing for good, it is useless for Beijing to insist that this has to be one of cooperation. But both sides should agree on the bottom line —not let competition slide into confrontation. This is possible not only because major power relations are resilient despite being competitive, but also because in today’s world it is neither possible for Washington to rally an anti-China alliance nor for Beijing to lead an anti-American Global South. Most of America’s allies have China as their largest trading partner. They, like all other countries, will be careful enough to make choices on issues, rather than blindly pick America’s side. With liberal democracy in steady decline, even American allies won’t buy ‘democracy vs autocracy’ in a post-western world. America’s different attitudes toward the Russo-Ukrainian war and Israeli-Iranian war at the same time tell more than anything about its double standard and hypocrisy. I have no doubt that when Donald Trump steps down from his second term, America’s global image and credibility will have been further tarnished.

AIM FOR MUTUALLY ASSURED COEXISTENCE

If the Cold War was characterized by mutually assured destruction between two bitter enemies, perhaps today the two competitors could aim for mutually assured coexistence. In my view, the mutually assured coexistence between China and the US can be earned through increasing open lines of communication, enhancing confidence building, cooperating wherever they can and working together to shoulder major powers’ international responsibilities.

TRUST BUT TALK

After signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) with Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1987, President Ronald Reagan famously said “trust but verify.” This is but a polite way to say “since I don’t trust you, therefore we have to verify.” The same logic applies today: trust is not necessarily a precondition for dialogue or interaction between Beijing and Washington. The US and the USSR had no trust at all, but they still managed to establish a litany of confidence-building measures and cooperate in eradicating smallpox and joint exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes.

If ‘trust but verify’ has characterized the Cold War era, perhaps ‘trust but talk’ is the right paradigm for China and the US today. During the Cold War, the worst fear of the US and USSR was a nuclear exchange. Therefore, limitation, reduction and verification of each other’s nuclear stockpiles became a must. This is not the case between the US and China. Even if China is fast developing its nuclear arsenal as the Pentagon has concluded, its reported 600 or so nuclear warheads now in stockpile are but roughly one tenth of those of the United States. Hence, the first priority for the two competitors is to cultivate a habit of talking to each other regularly to avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations. Seeing the two titans talking rather than wrestling is also a huge relief for people in the rest of the world.

So far, talks between Beijing and Washington that were largely disrupted by Covid and Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit in 2022 have resumed. They include high-level military-to-military communication, the US–China Defense Policy Coordination Talks and the US–China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings. It is good to see even something new: in 2024, General Wu Yanan, commander of the PLA’s Southern Command, held a video teleconference with Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command. It is needless to say how important these mechanisms are, yet they should not be business as usual. Instead, exchanges of visits by senior military officers should be regularized; the hot line that was established in 2008 should be used more often; and direct communications between pilots and sailors should be encouraged since more close encounters are bound to happen not only in and near China’s waters and airspace, but also elsewhere as the PLA becomes more involved in its operations globally.

PREVENT ACCIDENTS AT SEA AND IN THE AIR

American aircraft regularly conduct close-in surveillance and reconnaissance in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) while its naval vessels sail through the waters off the islands and rocks claimed by China in the South China Sea. In the Pentagon’s 2023 report on China’s military and security developments, the United States has documented over 180 instances of PLA ‘coercive and risky’ air intercepts against US aircraft in the region between the fall of 2021 and fall of 2023. This would literally mean that in every four days, such dangerous situations will occur. So, at least in theory, another collision, like the deadly one between a Chinese fighter and an American spy plane in 2001, seems to be a question of when, not if.

For decades, bilateral consultations between the Chinese and US navies have been struggling over the Chinese term ‘An Quan’ (安全) which in English could mean either security or safety. Americans want more technical discussions on safety—to avoid close and dangerous encounters between ships and aircraft while the Chinese point at their security concern —the US Navy’s surveillance and reconnaissance in China’s EEZ and its ‘freedom of navigation operations’ in the South China Sea are provocations against China’s sovereignty that should be stopped or at least reduced; Americans ask Chinese ships monitoring American ships to keep a safe distance and Chinese would say you are most safe if you don’t come at all. In international forays, the Chinese delegates have often pointed out that all these dangerous close encounters occur near Chinese airspace and territorial sea and not the US airspace and territorial sea.

The international law of the sea is not of much help. The articles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) include ambiguities that can be selectively interpreted by parties to justify their own positions. The reason is that the UNCLOS was concluded after nine years of negotiations, the longest in human history. To speed up the negotiations, necessary compromises were made here and there to allow flexibility.

My own experience might be useful in understanding this thorny issue. I led a Chinese delegation to the Pentagon in 2013 to discuss legal implications of freedom of navigation—the focus of disagreement. Although the best legal experts on both sides were present, the only consensus was on something obvious —namely that ‘freedom of navigation and overflight’ should be practiced as stipulated in UNCLOS. However, the participants hugely disagreed on what constitutes ‘freedom of navigation and overflight’; what ‘peaceful purposes’ are; and to what extent ‘due regard’ should be paid to the rights and interests of the littoral states. It reminded me of what Otto Von Bismarck once said: “Laws are like sausages, it’s better not to see them being made.” In this regard, the UNCLOS looks like the longest sausage ever made!

But still there is one important consensus between Beijing and Washington: neither side wants an accident, let alone confrontation. Therefore, the two militaries not only need to let their airmen and sailors observe good airmanship and seamanship as required by bilateral and multilateral agreements to prevent accidents, but also to explore what has to be done after an accident has occurred. In 2020, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and the US Department of Defense convened the first Crisis Communication Working Group meeting by video teleconference to discuss concepts of crisis communication, crisis prevention and crisis management. This is the first time that crisis management was officially mentioned. It was a bold step in the right direction, but unfortunately it has discontinued due to Covid and ensuing tensions.

AVOID CONFLICT IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

However an accident in the South China Sea might occur, it is hard to believe that it would trigger a full-blown conflict between the Chinese and American militaries, although deafening nationalistic outcries on both sides must be anticipated. The deadly collision between a Chinese fighter and an American spy plane in 2001 didn’t prove to be the end of the world. American crews were released after the US government issued a letter of ‘two sorries’ instead of making an official apology and the disassembled American EP-3E aircraft was returned. The fatal incident was resolved in 11 days. Tacit and skillful diplomacy prevailed and saved face for both sides.

The only issue that can drag China and the US into a full-blown conflict is the Taiwan issue. Currently, a dangerous action-reaction is unfolding: as the US is suspicious of a potential attack from the mainland it speeds up arms sales and expands training and personnel exchanges to turn Taiwan into a ‘porcupine’. An angry but increasingly confident China is making responses by not only sending more warplanes to routinely fly over the median line in the Strait, which previously acted as a buffer between the sides, but also doing all sorts of exercises in preparing for the worst scenario. These exercises have been on the rise. At the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue, Hegseth spared no effort to describe how the China threat was real and could be ‘imminent’. He further speculated that the PLA has been asked to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. This is crying wolf. According to China’s 2005 anti-secession law, one of the three conditions that may lead the mainland to resort to non-peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue is that Beijing concludes that the prospect of peaceful reunification has been exhausted forever. But there is no indication that Beijing has drawn such a discouraging conclusion even after Taiwan elected Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as Taiwanese leader in January 2025.

In his meeting with former Taiwanese leader Ma Ying-jeou in April 2024, President Xi Jinping said it is imperative to promote the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and the key is to adhere to the one-China principle. China has never announced a timetable for reunification. China’s defense budgets after the war in Ukraine remain lower than two percent of its GDP. This forms a sharp contrast to America’s call on its European and Asian allies to increase their defense spending to five percent of their GDP. This speaks volumes about China’s calm and confidence, and in a way, about Beijing’s assessment of the China–US relationship.

The mainland also tries its best to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. Reportedly, 1.5 million Taiwanese worked and lived in the mainland before Covid. That means at least six percent of the middle- and upper-class Taiwanese people didn’t mind living in a totally different political system so long as it provided them better opportunities of all sorts than in Taiwan. In September 2023, China unveiled a plan in which Beijing vowed to make it easier for Taiwanese people to live and work in Fujian province—including buying property, and promises of equal treatment for Taiwan’s students to enrol in public schools, and connect the Chinese port city of Xiamen and Taiwan’s Jinmen that is a few miles away with gas, electricity and a bridge.

Washington should realize that for Beijing, everything could come to a stop if the Taiwan issue is mishandled. Therefore, for peace to prevail in the Taiwan Strait, the US should let Beijing believe that it is not hollowing out its declared ‘One China’ policy. If no direct confrontation with Russia is the bottom line of the US, then equally, no war with China—a rising power—should be a red line for the US as an existing power.

COOPERATE WHEREVER POSSIBLE

The right way of making competition ‘healthy’ is to cooperate wherever possible. Three areas are particularly noteworthy: artificial intelligence (AI), cyber and outer space. As the strongest nations on earth, China and the US have indispensable responsibilities in taking the lead in crafting rules and regulations in these new domains for mankind.

When meeting in San Francisco in November 2023, President Xi and President Biden agreed to establish an intergovernmental dialogue on AI. Presumably the most important principle to agree on is absolute human oversight over possible application of AI in nuclear command & control systems. For Beijing and Washington to talk about that, first of all they have to explain to the other side what their nuclear command & control system looks like. This won’t happen in the foreseeable future. But if indeed China is increasing its nuclear arsenal, its huge nuclear disparity with the US could gradually change and it could take a more proactive attitude towards nuclear talks. At the same time, a more realistic approach is to discuss no-first-use of nuclear weapons that China has championed for decades. This won’t be easily acceptable because America’s allies seek a US nuclear umbrella. But a pledge of no first use won’t cripple a nuclear power’s capability for retaliation. Given Russia’s thinly-veiled threats to use nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine and the fact that there is no prospect of ending the war any time soon, this seems to be a more realistic priority.

In cyber, it is difficult to tell whether cyber incidents are espionage or cyber warfare. But the bottom line is not to attack critical information networks, such as military command & control systems. In 2013, Washington and Moscow established links between their national computer emergency response teams, agreed to warn each other of cyber exercises through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre and set up a direct hotline between the White House and the Kremlin. Beijing and Washington also have hotlines at governmental and military levels. Eventually, both countries might wish to exchange a list of sensitive targets that should be forbidden from coming under attack in any circumstance.

Significant cooperation between China and the US in outer space is unlikely since the Wolf Amendment passed by the United States Congress in 2011 restricts, but doesn’t completely prohibit, NASA’s cooperation with China in outer space. This is out of fear that China might ‘steal’ American technology. But the irony is that, by 2030, China may have the world’s only space station in outer space and American astronauts may have to request for a ride. In 2019, China became the first country to land a lunar probe on the dark side of the moon and NASA got congressional approval for a specific interaction with China’s space agency to monitor China’s landing using NASA’s Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter.

SHOULDERING MAJOR POWER RESPONSIBILITIES

Major powers shoulder major responsibilities. As the two largest economies in the world, China and the US have to cooperate for the well-being of other nations as well. Take the Middle East as an example. In the Middle East, Beijing and Washington used to have a similar stance on two important issues—preventing Iran from developing a nuclear bomb and a two-state solution for the Israeli-Hamas conflict.

Neither Beijing nor Washington have wished to see Iran become a nuclear weapons state. But America’s sudden and massive bombing on Iran’s nuclear facilities came as a big surprise for everyone. Beijing naturally condemned it particularly because these facilities were under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On this issue, China’s biggest advantage is Tehran’s trust. China has been the only major power to give Iran an economic lifeline in the face of US sanctions. Even if China has condemned Israel’s and the US’ obvious violation of Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Beijing should make it clear to Tehran that should it decide to close the Strait of Hormuz, it would not only seriously jeopardize one of the most important international shipping lanes, but also doom its own economy that is heavily reliant on oil export.

The United States has long supported a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that would give Palestinians sovereignty in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza. That has been American policy since Washington helped broker the Oslo Accords in 1993. Trump is not interested in a two-state solution. But he won’t be in the Oval Office forever. As Gaza grapples with the worst violence in over 50 years, the two-state solution first proposed in a 1974 UN resolution may look like a dream, but even a dream is useful if it gives people hope. And how do we know the two-state solution is just a dream? No war will last forever and more countries have come to recognize Palestine as more and more people have died in Gaza. As of 18 June 2025, over 57,800 people have been reportedly killed in the Gaza war. A two-state solution will almost certainly win more sympathy and look more acceptable after the war is over.

In the war in Ukraine, President Trump, who once bragged to resolve this issue in 24 hours, asked China to help. As time goes on, Washington seems more and more frustrated by an ever-lasting stalemate. China’s readiness to broker talks between the warring parties was already reflected in its 12-point peace plan in February 2023 and its joint six-point proposal with Brazil in May 2024. But China could not solve the problem single-handedly by making a demand on President Putin to end the war, as some in the West wishfully proposed. It is too early to tell what the end game will look like. But if it is eventually a ceasefire or armistice, perhaps China can join other major powers in providing a collective security guarantee. Or if one day peacekeeping is needed, China could take the lead in sending peacekeepers along with other troop-contributing countries from the Global South. This is much better than any proposals of sending in NATO troops which will definitely be rejected by Russia.

Conclusion

Major power relations are never as good as one would wish but can become less risky. Given that China’s economy has slowed down in recent years, economists are less certain that China may overtake the US as the largest economy in the next decade as was widely assumed before. Yet this won’t matter tremendously in that whoever remains superior, the gap between the two largest economies will be marginal. This suggests their competition could indeed intensify, but also that no one will lose too much from cooperation. China and the US are not enemies yet, and there is no scientific law saying that competitors are bound to become enemies.

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