近日，新加坡国立大学李光耀公共政策学院院长马凯硕教授，与复旦大学特聘教授、上海社科院中国学研究所所长、春秋研究院研究员张维为教授在《Security Times》（《Atlantic Times》第50届慕尼黑安全会议特刊）上发表文章，阐述钓鱼岛问题及中美日三国关系。双方观点针锋相对。张维为主张：中国走和平发展的道路，现在到了日本和有关各方看清并尊重中国底线的时候；而马凯硕则认为，中国摆出强硬的新姿态，将损害长远利益。观察者网杨晗轶翻译马凯硕一文如下，以资读者参考：
Peaceful rise or a new Cold War?
Appeasing domestic nationalist concerns comes at a strategic price for China | By Kishore Mahbubani
Does China's new assertive stance reflect a strong muscular government demonstrating that China will now behave like a normal great power? Or does it reflect a weak government that now has to bend to strong winds of domestic nationalism? We will never know the answer to these questions. But we can work out the implications for China if it continues down this assertive road. For every gain it makes on the regional front, it could pay a heavy price on the global front. This is the new dilemma that China will have to deal with.
China's leaders have argued that they have reacted strongly because they have been provoked. This is true. The Philippines unwisely upped the ante when it deployed a naval destroyer around the disputed Scarborough Shoal in April 2012. The Chinese government could not be seen to be weak in its response. Similarly, when the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda went ahead with the nationalization of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands on July 7, 2012, despite a direct request from President Hu Jintao not to do so, China was forced into a position of responding.
While some of these strong reactions were inevitable, it is unclear whether China worked out clearly the long-term consequences of these moves. They have dramatically changed global and regional perceptions of China. For over a decade or so, China had pulled off a geopolitical miracle by rising up the ladder of great powers without ringing any alarm bells. A large part of it was due to the wisdom China inherited from Deng Xiaoping who counselled that China should take a low profile, swallow bitter humiliation and avoid any kind of assertiveness. Deng was strong enough to pull this off. His successors clearly find it more and more difficult to persuade the Chinese population to continue heeding this wisdom.
Despite this, China's leaders can quietly pull back from some of the strong positions it has taken, as they have backfired. Let me cite three. Firstly, as I document in "The Great Convergence," it was unwise of China to deposit a map containing the nine-dash line (that covered virtually all of the South China Sea) with a UN Commission in 2009 (see map page 14). This nine-dash line will become an albatross around China's neck as it is entirely indefensible under contemporary international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As China continues to grow and emerge as a global power, it will discover like the US that the UNCLOS will protect many of its global interests to have free and open access to seaways around the world.
So if China vigorously defends the nine-dash line, it will essentially be shooting itself in the foot as it will be undermining its own long-term global interests. Clearly China cannot withdraw the nine-dash line but it can quietly and privately "clarify" its meaning to indicate that it is only claiming some traditional rocks and islands within this area. Indeed, China has already given some ASEAN countries private assurances that it does not claim all the waters within the nine-dash line as territorial waters of China. To allow China to backtrack quietly from the nine-dash line, it may be best not to push China for a public or official clarification.
Secondly, it was unwise of China to be perceived as dividing ASEAN at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh on July12, 2012. It will go down in China's diplomatic history as one of its lowest points since only one out of the ten ASEAN countries supported China's point of view at this crucial meeting.
But China paid an even heavier price than this short-term diplomatic loss. A strong and cohesive ASEAN community had quietly emerged as a geopolitical asset for Beijing as it ensured that ASEAN would not be captured or manipulated against China. By contrast, a divided ASEAN naturally provided geopolitical opportunities that China's rivals could exploit.
American diplomats were right in asserting publicly that several ASEAN states had whispered to them privately that they welcomed a stronger American presence in Southeast Asia to balance a more powerful China. Fortunately, Xi Jinping has made cultivation of ASEAN a priority. That should help China.
Thirdly, Beijing's constant deployment of naval vessels and aircraft in the waters around the Senkaku and Diaoyu islands has turned Japanese public opinion strongly against China. Many Japanese are now clearly apprehensive about China's rise.
All this has helped Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's efforts to create a more "normal" Japan. He wants to drop his country's post-World War II pacifist culture and develop a defense policy and posture befitting its size. Many other countries, including the US and South Korea, are concerned by this new drift in Abe's policies. But they find it hard to restrain him as long as he enjoys strong domestic support, some of which is a result of a nationalist backlash against China.
One development that China needs to watch carefully is the growing dialogue and interaction between Russia, India, and Japan. These are the three largest neighbors China has to deal with. If they begin to cooperate closely out of a rising shared concern over China's perceived assertiveness, China may well sail into a more difficult global geopolitical environment.
China has consistently declared that it is committed to a "peaceful rise". On balance, it is clear that this remains China's policy. But if it continues with its assertiveness over maritime disputes, it could dramatically alter global perceptions and attitudes towards China and also end up creating a more difficult global geopolitical environment for China.